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PROBLEMS IN THE REMOVAL OF FEDERAL CIVIL 
SERVANTS* 
Ivor L. M. Richardsont 
THE publicity given in the past few years to the loyalty and security program has brought the civil servant of the federal 
government increasingly before the public eye. At the same time 
little attention has been paid to the plight of a civil servant who is 
dismissed from his post for reasons other than those relating to 
loyalty and security. It is the purpose of this paper to consider 
different aspects of the removal of civil servants. We shall discuss 
(1) the government's power to remove civil servants both at com-
mon law and under statutes which deal with the exercise of the 
removal power, (2) the procedural remedies available to a gov-
ernment worker ousted from office, (3) the loyalty program, and 
(4) the effect of the invocation by a civil servant of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
A. General 
In the absence of a statute regulating removal the power to re-
move is unlimited1 and, failing a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision to the contrary, is exercisable by the appointing officer as an 
incident of the power to appoint.2 The grant of a general power 
to remove carries with it the right to remove at any time or in any 
manner deemed best with or without notice3 but, on the other 
hand, where the causes for which an officer may be removed are 
specified in a statute or in the Constitution, notice and hearing 
are essential.4 
• This article is a chapter taken from a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the 
University of Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. 
degree. 
t Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.-Ed. 
1 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 225 (1839). 
2 Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574 (1900); Bratton v. United States, 
90 Ct. Cl. 604 (1940); Levy v. Woods, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 145. 
3 In an unusual case, United States ex rel. Brown v. Lane, 40 App. D.C. 533 (1913), ~ 
the court said that, since the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to remove 
from a tribal council any member or members "for good cause to be by him determined," 
he might remove such members without notice or hearing. However, the court pointed 
out that had the statute stopped at the words "for good cause" a different case would have 
been presented. 
4 Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 21 S.Ct. 842 (1901); Shurtleff v. United States, 
189 U.S. 311, 23 S.Ct. 535 (1903); Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App. D.C. 310 (1914). 
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As well as numerous special statutes affecting particular offices 
and employments, there are five statutes dealing with the exercise 
of the removal power, each with its own procedure for effecting 
removals: the Hatch Act5 relating to removals for political activity; 
the Civil Service Act of 19126 and the Veterans Preference Act7 
restricting the removal of civil service employees to dismissal for 
cause; section 12 of the latter statute8 regulating reductions in 
force such as layoffs and demotions for reasons of economy; the 
5 53 Stat. L. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) § 118 (i). For procedure, see 5 
C.F.R. §§4.1 to 4.108 (1949) as amended. 
6 37 Stat. L. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §652. The section provides: 
"No person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed or sus-
pended without pay therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of 
such service and for reasons given in writing. Any person whose removal or suspension 
without pay is sought shall (I) have notice of the same and of any charges preferred 
against him; (2) be furnished with a copy of such charges; (3) be allowed a reasonable 
time for filing a written answer to such charges, with affidavits; and (4) be furnished at 
the earliest practicable date with a written decision of such answer. No examination of 
witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the direction of the officer 
or employee directing the removal or suspension without pay. Copies of the charges, the 
notice of hearing, the answer, the reasons for removal or suspension without pay, and 
the order of removal of suspension without pay shall be made a part of the records of 
the proper department or agency, as shall also the reasons for reduction in grade or 
compensation; and copies of the same shall be furnished, upon request, to the person 
affected and to the Civil Service Commission. . . ." The courts have generally interpreted 
this section as requiring notice both of reasons for removal and of the charges against 
the employee [e.g., Bennett v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 322 (1939)) but this is not so. The 
section refers to two general groups, (I) persons removed by the appointing power "for 
reasons given in writing" and (2) persons removed by the appointing power upon 
"charges." In either case the removal is authorized only "for such cause as will promote 
the efficiency of such service" [Arant v. United States, !i5 Ct. Cl. 327 (1920)). Admittedly 
the statutory regulations [5 C.F.R. §§9.101 and 9.102 (1949) as amended) require the 
employing agency to give notice both of the reasons for dismissal and of the charges, but 
it is not settled if such regulations can give civil servants greater protection than that 
required by statute; the general rule has been that they cannot (see the cases cited in 
note 53 infra). Even United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390, 26 S.Ct. 469 (1906), has 
been interpreted to accord to this view-Simon v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 182 (1949). 
The reason for this is that such regulations are ultra vires the statutory rule-making 
power, and though " •.. the President •.. has the right to establish regulations for the 
guidance of his subordinates in deciding upon those who shall be removed .•• [he) has 
no power to say that if these regulations are not followed the United States shall be 
pecuniarily liable to the employee. Only Congress can say this .•.. " Simon v. United 
States, supra at 204. 
7 58 Stat. L. 390 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §863. The largest class covered 
by this statute is that of honorably discharged servicemen and women who have perma-
nent or indefinite civil service appointments to positions in the executive branch of the 
government. The procedural requirements are greater than under the 1912 statute as 
they also require thirty days written notice and provide for appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission on substantive as well as procedural grounds. 
s The section applies to all persons employed in a civil capacity in the executive 
branch of the government except those appointed by the President alone or with the 
consent of the Senate. It provides that reduction-in-force programs shall be implemented, 
having regard to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service and effi-
ciency ratings, and there is a similar provision for thirty days written notice and appeal 
to the Civil Service Commission. 
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1950 statute9 authorizing summary suspension and removal of per-
sons in certain sensitive departments and agencies for reasons of 
national security. It is not proposed to consider these statutory 
provisions. in detail10 as the same legal principles are applied in 
each case. 
In general,11 the only two grounds upon which a federal em-
ployee may successfully attack the validity of his dismissal are (1) 
where the procedural requirements incident to his removal were 
not complied with, and (2) where the action of the removing 
officer was taken in bad faith or was arbitrary and capricious. 
The power to review a case to see if it meets the procedural 
requirements extends no further than that,12 although it must be 
admitted that even minor procedural irregularities are sufficient 
to invalidate dismissals.13 Furthermore, the courts will exercise 
jurisdiction if the stated cause is one made invalid by statute or 
regulation,14 but in this connection it is important to note that, 
even where causes for removal are specifically stated, the appoint-
ing officer will almost invariably be held to have a further right 
of removal at his pleasure unless the grounds for removal are 
expressly restricted by statute.11• 
9 64 Stat. L. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22. The act authorizes departmental or 
agency heads to suspend employees in particular departments and agencies when it is 
deemed necessary in the interests of national security. Such suspension is at the absolute 
discretion of the departmental or agency head and must be followed either by reinstate-
ment or by final removal accoi;ding to prescribed procedures. 
10 For an excellent summary see note, 52 CoL. L. REY. 787 (1952). 
11 One exception to this is in reduction-in-force cases where the courts will also review 
an alleged violation of the employee's statutory right to be retained in preference to 
persons in inferior categories. See Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323, 68 S.Ct. 1020 (1948); 
Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470. But note the restrictive effect in 
this connection of the decision in Elder v. Brannan, 341 U.S. 277, 71 S.Ct. 685 (1951). 
12 Elchibegoff v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 709 (1952); Love v. United States, (Ct. CI. 
1951) 98 F. Supp. 770; Powell v. Brannan, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 871. The general 
principle is that "The determination of whether or not a person's discharge would pro-
mote the efficiency of the Government service is vested in the administrative officer and 
no court has power to review his action if that action was taken in good faith." Gadsden 
v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487 at 489, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948). 
13 Thus, in Stringer v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. 30, 90 F. Supp. 375 (1950), 29 days 
written notice preceded by several days verbal notice did not satisfy the statutory require-
ment of 30 days adverse written notice. And see Norden v. Royall, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 90 
F. Supp. 834; and Deak v. Pace, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 997. It should be noted, 
however, that proceedings involving the "selection or tenure of an officer or employee of 
the United States" are specifically exempted from the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act which establishes a code of minimum procedural requirements for admin• 
istrative adjudications. 60 Stat. L. 237 at 239 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001. 
14 Levine v. Farley, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 186 at 190-191. Again, the removal 
is invalid if made by someone other than the appropriate officer (who is usually the 
appointing officer). Stilling v. United States, 41 Ct. CI. 61 (1906); United States v. Wicker-
sham, 201 U.S. 390, 26 S.Ct. 469 (1906). 
15 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 23 S.Ct. 535 (1903); Morgan v. T.V .A., (6th 
Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 990. 
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Where the procedural requirements have been complied with 
in the removal of a federal employee, the action of the adminis-
trative officer can be set aside only if it is shown that it was not 
taken in good faith. But the courts have not been at all consistent 
in determining the protection which this requirement confers on 
federal employees.16 It is clear that the acquittal of a government 
servant upon criminal charges preferred against him is not suffi-
cient to establish that his removal "to promote the efficiency of 
the service" was arbitrary.17 Furthermore, the fact that the Presi-
dent and the Civil Service Commission consider that the charges 
against the employee are not substantiated and that there exists 
no proper cause for his removal is irrelevant, since that matter is 
for the removing officer to decide.18 In some cases the courts have 
tended to overlook the good faith requirement altogether19 and 
with unbecoming judicial self-abnegation have ruled that, if the 
formal procedural steps are satisfied, judicial inquiry is absolutely 
foreclosed.20 However, in the more recent cases21 there seems to 
16 Cf. Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 682 (1934), with Gadsden v. United States, 
111 Ct. CI. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948). 
17 Croghan v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 577, 89 F. Supp. 1002 (1950); Bryant v. 
United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 460 (1952). This is because the considerations which enter into 
an administrative determination of whether an employee has been guilty of such mis-
conduct or delinquency in the performance of the duties of his· position as to justify his 
removal for the good of the service are entirely dissimilar to those necessarily involved 
in the conviction of a person of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Although 
government servants need not be perfect nonentities so far as political expression is con-
cerned, the removing officer may well take the view that the fact of having had such 
charges levelled against him (and in the case of a jury trial a prima facie case has first 
been made against him) may constitute reasonable cause for removing an employee. 
18 Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct. CI. 466 (1918); Morse v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 
139 (1924). And see 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 79 at 83 (1913), confirming 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 356 
(1896). 
19 Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470 at 471; Levine v. Farley, (D.C. 
Cir. 1939) 109' F. (2d) 186 at 191; and, in particular, Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 
682 (1934). 
20 E.g., "The allegations that the plaintiff was innocent of the charges preferred 
against him, that his removal was the result of a concerted action by certain individuals 
and officials who had entered into a conspiracy to cause his removal, that his removal was 
based on perjurious statements obtained through duress and undue influence, and that the 
investigation which resulted in his removal was biased, prejudiced, and unfair, are 
immaterial. It is not within the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into the guilt or 
innocence of the plaintiff as to the charges upon which he was removed from office .••• 
It appearing from the averments of the petition that every step requisite to the removal 
from office of an employee of the Government in the classified civil service was taken by 
Bureau officials in the plaintiff's case, action in removing him from office is conclusive 
and is not subject to review by the court." Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 682 at 
685 (1934). 
21 E.g., Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948); Levy v. 
United States, 118 Ct. CI. 106 (1950); Vallesteros v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 218 (1953); 
Knotts v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 121 F. Supp. 630 (1954). 
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have been a greater willingness to insist upon the actual and not 
merely nominal compliance with the requirement of good faith-
to assert that when discretion is conferred on an administrative 
officer it must be honestly exercised and that, if his decision is 
arbitrary or capricious or in bad faith, the courts have power to 
review it and to set it aside.22 
B. Remedies 
Scanty though it is, the protection afforded the government 
employee by the statutory provisions is greater in theory than in 
practice. For he encounters many pitfalls when he attempts to 
secure judicial review of his removal. When a government servant 
has been separated in violation of either a statute or a statutory 
regulation the Court of Claims has jurisdiction23 to award him 
his salary during the period of unjustified removal. But, as a 
result of an almost unbelievably crass misconstruction of an earlier 
decision, the court for a while effectively prevented employees 
from recovering compensation for removals violating statutory 
procedural requirements. The discharged employee had almost 
invariably been replaced by the time his action was heard and 
consequently the court said that his remedy was an appropriate 
proceeding to try the right to office so that his successor might 
also be heard as to his right to the compensation provided and 
to the office itself.24 This meant that the discharged employee 
;22 Thus, where a civil servant has been discharged not for a cause that promoted the 
efficiency of the service, but maliciously, merely because his superior did not like him, or 
merely because he wanted his job for a friend, the discharge is wrongful and illegal and 
the employee is entitled to recover whatever loss he may have suffered therefrom. Gadsden 
v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 at 127 (1948). See too Knotts v. United 
States, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 121 F. Supp. 630 (1954). 
23 28 u.s.c. (1952) §1491. 
24 See, e.g., Goodwin v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 218 (1932), in which the court applied 
dicta from O'Neil v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 89 (1921) which was properly dependent 
for its validity on the fact that it concerned an executive regulation relating to removals 
which was ultra vires the statutory rule-making power under the 1883 statute and before 
the 1912 statute. This same doctrine was followed in numerous other cases, e.g., "Wilmeth 
v. United States, 64 CL Cl. 368 (1928); O'Leary v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 635 (1933); 
Hart v. United States, 91 CL Cl. 308 (1940). And see Westwood, "The 'Right' of an 
Employee of the United States Against Arbitrary Discharge," 7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 212 
(1938). Also compare this practice with the dictum of a district court in Curran v. Hig-
giston. (D.C. Mass. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 969 at 970: "The generally accepted method of 
testing the right of a federal official to hold office is to sue at law in the Court of Claims 
for salary. Such a remedy is plain, adequate, and complete." 
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had to begin again in another court because the Court of Claims 
has no jurisdiction to determine the title to office. However, since 
194625 the court has conveniently ignored the reasoning of the 
earlier decisions and without considering whether or not the claim-
ant has in fact been replaced has, in several cases,26 allowed a civil 
servant removed in violation of a statutory provision to recover 
his compensation. 
Again, many employees have fallen at the final hurdle when the 
government met them with the defense of laches.27 Admittedly, 
no matter however unjust and unwarranted the removal or sus-
pension of a public officer may be, public policy requires that he 
should promptly take any action necessary to assert his rights28 
to the end that, if he is successful in his action, the government 
service may be disturbed as little as possible and two salaries shall 
not be paid for a single service.29 But to foreclose relief on this 
ground when the delay amounted to a few months only indicates 
unnecessary solicitude for the government's interests.80 
The federal employee also encounters difficulties if he com-
mences an action in the district court. His available remedies are 
quo warranto, mandamus and injunction depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case. Quo warranto has long been considered 
25 Elchibegoff v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 541 (1946). 
26 Simon v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 182 (1949); Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct. 
Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948). Reinstatement of the employee or an offer to do so is 
not a prerequisite to recovery. See Blackmar v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 693, 120 F. Supp. 
408 (1954). 
27 The employee must also, of course, be careful to join all interested persons or 
bodies as parties to the action. Thus, the superior officer is an indispensable party if the 
decree granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either by exercising a 
power lodged in him or having a subordinate exercise it for him. See Williams v. Fanning, 
332 U.S. 490, 68 S.Ct. 188 (1947). 
28 Caswell v. Morgenthau, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 296 (eighteen months delay too 
long); United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293 (1919) (twenty months 
too long). 
29 Farley v. Abbetmeier, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 569. But it may reasonably be 
argued that (1) the government has itself done wrong in paying A's salary to B, and (2) 
in the case where the office has not been filled, the government is also paying a salary 
for no service. 
so Thus, in Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77 at 81, 42 S.Ct. 9 (1921), eleven months 
delay was considered too long as the facts did not disclose "that exercise of reasonable 
diligence .•. which the law imposes upon him as a duty if he would recover compen-
sation for services in an office which the Government might fill with another .•.. " But 
it was found that Norris was ready, willing and able to discharge the duties of the office 
at all times, and eleven months delay does not seem very long when we bear in mind 
that his discharge had occurred only six months after the enactment of the statute guar-
anteeing him notice and a chance to answer. 
1955] REMOVAL OF FEDERAL CIVIL SERVANTS 225 
the proper remedy for trying title to a public office.31 But the 
absence of cases in which it has been utilized indicates that its 
practical value is slight. The two main disadvantages32 of bring-
ing a quo warranto action are that it is not available where no 
successor has been named, as the present incumbent is the proper 
party defendant,33 and that, although the judgment in quo war-
ranto provides for the ouster of the defendant, it is very doubtful 
if it can secure the reinstatement of the removed officer.34 
Where quo warranto does not afford the desired relief man-
damus is the proper legal remedy for seeking restoration to office. 
It too is hedged around with procedural niceties which frequently 
prove fatal to petitioning government employees. In the first 
place, district courts of the United States other than the district 
court of the District of Columbia35 have no jurisdiction to hear 
original claims for a writ of mandamus,36 nor will an action seek-
ing similar relief fare any better if dressed up as a mandatory in-
junction37 or a declaratory judgment38 because the courts cannot 
do indirectly what they have no authority to do directly.39 Sec-
ondly, the writ is not available where someone is in de jure,40 
or apparently even de facto41 possession of the office, as in such 
31 See comment, 30 ILL. L. REv. 1037 at 1045 ff. (1936). 
32 Another drawback is that, absent statutory provision, quo warranto does not lie in 
respect of an employment as distinguished from an office. See FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY 
LEGAL REMEDIES 166-167 (1926); 2 BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS 1259-1260 (1913). 
33 This follows from United States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785. And see 
FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 148 (1926). 
34 Although it has been argued that quo warranto can restore a removed officer to 
his office [30 ILL. L. REv. 1037 at 1050-1051 (1936)], it appears that this is not so. See 
Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App. D.C. 310 at 319-321 (1941); Priddie v. Thompson, (C.C. W.Va. 
1897) 82 F. 186 at 189. 
35 United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (37 
U.S.) 524 (1838). 
36 Petrowski v. Nutt, (9th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 938. The reason for this lack of 
jurisdiction is the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions conferring authority 
to issue such writs. The district court of the District of Columbia is in a special position. 
The court, in addition to being a federal court, is also charged with the enforcement of 
the domestic law, and by the Act of 1801 (2 Stat. L. 103) creating the courts, it inherited 
jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the State of Maryland then existing in the 
ceded area, which includes jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus in original proceedings. 
37 Alley v. Craig, (D.C. Me. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 576. 
38 Palmer v. Walsh, (D.C. Ore. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 64. 
39 Ibid. And see Fredericks v. Rossell, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 95 F. Supp. 754. 
40 United States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785 at 790-791; United States ex 
rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805 at 809. Contra, Kalbfus v. Siddons, 
42 App. D.C. 310 (1914). 
41 People ex rel. McLaughlin v. Board of Police, 1J4 N.Y. 450, 67 N.E. 78 (1~03) 
[cited in United States ex rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805]; Uruted 
States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785 at 791. 
226 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
a case the title to office is in dispute and is within the province 
of quo warranto. 
Again, · the issue of a writ lies in the discretion of the court42 
and it is not demandable as of right; and its effectiveness has been 
circumscribed by the reluctance of the courts to interfere in the 
affairs of the executive branch of the government.43 Consequent-
ly, the writ will not norm~lly issue unless the duty of the officer 
to act is clearly established and plainly defined and unless the obli-
gation to act is preemptory.44 But, the judicial aura of protec-
tion of official actions of the executive branch of the government 
should not prevent mandamus issuing where an officer has wrongly 
interpreted the law when performing an official duty. Earlier 
cases45 suggested that mandamus could never control an executive 
·officer in such a case, but there is a hint in a more recent case46 
that an officer's interpretation of the law may be questioned if it 
is clearly wrong and the official action is arbitrary and capricious. 
This is a move in the right direction because, admitting that 
mandamus should not issue against an administrative officer where 
an exercise of judgment or discretion is necessary in determining 
his duty, it is equally clear that an officer should not be able to 
rely upon the mere necessity of reading the statutes in respect of 
their applicability to facts before him and thereby, under the 
claim of exercising discretion, avoid plain duty.47 
42 United States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785 at 789. 
43 E.g., United States ex rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805 at 809-
810: " ... courts always should proceed with extreme caution where the granting of the 
writ would result in interference by the judicial department with the management of the 
executive department of the government ... even where the petition for the writ is to 
perform a purely ministerial act •... " And see Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 497 
at 515-516 (1840); Borak v. Biddle, (D.C. Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 278. In view of this 
rather natural deference to ~e executive and under its discretionary power to refuse to 
issue the writ, the court would probably never mandamus the PresidenL See comment, 30 
!LL. L. REv. 1037 at 1052-1053 (1936) where the matter is fully discussed. 
44 Hammond v. Hull, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 23 at 25. Furthermore, it is only 
in clear cases of the illegality of action that courts will intervene to displace the judgments 
of administrative officers or bodies. 
45 United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 S.Ct. 12 (1888); United States 
ex rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805 at 809. 
46 Hammond v. Hull, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 23 at 25. 
47 United States ex rel. Rhodes v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 270 at 272, 
per Stephens, C.J., dissenting. And see Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221, 20 S.CL 
376 (1900). In Ginn v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 637 (1948), Ginn, who had· been sus-
pended from duty without pay for over a year pending investigation and decision of his 
citizenship and charges of fraudulent conduct in connection therewith, was held not 
entitled to recover his salary although the citizenship questions were resolved in his favor 
by another court, because of the commissioner's discretionary power to remove (and 
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Finally, the practical value of a successful action for a writ 
of mandamus is not very great. If the writ is granted because of 
the failure to satisfy the procedural requirements relating to re-
moval, it is no trouble for the appropriate officer immediately to 
dismiss the employee, this time taking care to follow the pre-
scribed procedure.48 It is obvious then that mandamus is not the 
panacea which the court of appeals claimed it to be in Kalbfus 
v. Siddons.49 
Certiorari is not the proper remedy to obtain reinstatement 
into office,50 and prohibition will probably not lie in such a case. 
Although there is a conflict of authority in state courts51 it seems 
that federal courts would refuse to issue the writ on the grounds 
that the officer or board in hearing charges against a government 
servant and conducting proceedings for his removal acts in an 
executive rather than in a judicial capacity.52 
The other remedy available to the government employee is 
to seek an injunction.and, although the advantages of being able 
to enjoin a proposed and unjustified removal over other remedies 
are obvious, the practical value of this type of relief is limited by 
two factors. In a succession of cases53 at the turn of the century 
incidentally, suspend) for cause. But, should this be so if the cause involved solely a 
question of law and the officer came to a wrong conclusion in law, for it is ludicrous to 
say that the fact of having had a question as to his citizenship raised may constitute 
reasonable cause for removing an employee. See note 17 supra. 
48 See Kaufman v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 91 at 104, 93 F. Supp. 1019 (1950). 
49 42 App. D.C. 310 (1914). It was asserted in that case that mandamus is the com-
plete remedy and it was .said, too, that it could aid a person illegally removed from office 
without notice and hearing since, the order of removal being void, the attempted appoint-
ment of a successor is a nullity. 
50 Because, on the one hand, the purpose of certiorari is to bring for review before a 
superior court the proceedings and judgments of inferior courts and tribunals clothed 
with authority to act judicially and, on the other hand, certiorari will not normally lie 
when there is another adequate remedy. See generally FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL 
REMEDIES, Part III (1926). 
51 See 115 A.L.R. 3 at 28 (1938). 
52 But in that legal "white elephant," Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App. D.C. 210 (1914), it 
was held that proceedings for the removal of a public officer are adversary or judicial in 
character and, if the organic law of the governmental entity is silent as to the mode of 
procedure, that the substantial principles of the common law as to proceedings affecting 
private rights must be observed. 
53 Morgan v. Nunn, (C.C. Tenn. 1898) 84 F. 551; Page v. Moffett, (C.C. N.J. 1898) 85 
F. 38; Taylor v. Kercheval, (C.C. Ind. 1897) 82 F. 497; Flemming v. Stahl, (C.C. Ark. 
1897) 83 F. 940; Couper v. Smyth, (C.C. Ga. 1897) 84 F. 757. Two contrary decisions were 
given by Jackson, D.J., in Priddie v. Thompson, (C.C. W.Va. 1897) 82 F. 186, and Butler 
v. White, (C.C. W.Va. 1897) 83 F. 578, but the latter case was reversed on appeal [171 
U.S. 379, 18 S.Ct. 949 (1898)]. 
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it was held that a court of equity could not enjoin an officer or 
board from removing officers, particularly where the removal 
was in the discretion of the removing authority. The decisions 
were based partly on the ground that the removed officer was 
presumed to have adequate protection by mandamus or quo war-
ranto if he wished to contest the validity of his removal or the 
right of his successor to the office, and partly on the ground that 
equity could protect only property rights,54 and an officer had no 
such rights in his office.55 
At the present time, however, the chief reason why injunctions 
are of such little use is that all administrative remedies must usual-
ly be exhausted before a writ will issue56 and, in the case of a 
removal from office, by that time it is too late. There is one 
exception to this which, though couched in general terms, has 
thus far been applied only in reduction in force cases. It has been 
held that, where the evidence tended to show that the removal 
of civil servants from their positions with the Veterans Adminis-
tration would be in violation of their rights under the Veterans 
Preference Act, the civil servants, who were faced with immediate 
discharge, were not required to exhaust administrative remedies 
prior to :institution of their actions for declaratory judgments de-
claring their proposed removal to be void.57 It is not easy to 
reconcile this exercise of jurisdiction with the refusal of jurisdic-
tion in earlier cases, unless we say that rights have so~e quality 
of "property". when granted by a statute which they lack when 
set forth in the Civil Service Regulations.58 It may well be due 
54 Applying In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S.Ct. 482 (1888). 
55 In Page v. Moffett, (C.C. N.J. 1898) 85 F. 38, the court went so far as to say that, 
while the President has the constitutional power to make regulations controlling the 
removal power of his subordinates, such regulations could never be regarded as laws 
because they were subject to modification or revocation at his whim. 
56 Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470; Hammond v. Hull, (D.C. Cir. 
1942) 131 F. (2d) 23 at 25. 
57 Reeber v. Rossell, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 108; Wettre v. Hague, (1st Cir. 
1948) 168 F. (2d) 825; Farrell v. Moomau, (D.C. Cal. 1948) 85 F. Supp. 125. And see 
Fischer v. Haeberle, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 652. But cf. Longfellow v. Gudger, 
(D.C. Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 653, where the requirement that employees with military 
preferences should be the last dismissed was completely disregarded and the plaintiff had 
no remedy from the courts. 
58 In Wettre v. Hague, (1st Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 825 at 826, the court was content 
to adopt a citation from Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 
at 566, 66 S.Ct. 322 (1946) that, "Of course, where the statute is so obviously violated that 
a 'sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress .•• created' to protect the interest 
of individuals or the public is clearly shown, a court of equity could, in a proper case, 
intervene." 
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to a question of interpretation. Regulations confer some discre-
tion on the Civil Service Commission and the courts may have 
considered that, in view of the discretionary nature of the regula-
tions, the "rights" were not set forth clearly enough to justify 
judicial interference in executive affairs. 
The protection of the Civil Service Act applies to all persons 
in the classified civil service but it is a simple matter for Congress 
or the President to exclude particular classes of civil servants from 
the benefits of those statutory provisions designed to prevent arbi-
trary removals. In order to be in the classified civil service a per-
son must not only have a competitive status but must also be in 
the service.59 Competitive status is one which permits promotion, 
transfer, reassignment or reinstatement without competitive ex-
amination60 and is usually acquired by receiving a probationary 
appointment after having passed a competitive examination. A 
person is in the classified civil service when he has a competitive 
status and occupies a classified position in the executive branch 
of the government. 61 All persons in the executive branch of the 
government are in the classified civil service unless excluded by 
statute or executive order, 62 but the Civil Service Commission has 
power to except positions from the classified service. 63 Further-
more, on the basis of an opinion of an attorney general64 it seemed 
that the President might at any tirrie circumvent the restrictions 
on removal imposed by the act by placing positions, the occupants 
of which in theory still retain their civil service status, under the 
several schedules to the statute.65 The control is not as to indi-
50 See generally Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46 at 52-54, affirmed 
by equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951). The term service refers to 
positions or offices; classified service, competitive service, classified (competitive) service, and 
classified civil service are interchangeable terms. 
60 5 C.F.R. §4.301 (a)5 (1949). 
61 5 C.F.R. §4.301 (a)4 (1949). 
62 But temporary appointees and probationers are excepted from the classified service 
[5 C.F.R. §§2.113 (a), 2.114 (a), 9.103, and §§2.114, 9.102 (a), 22.1 (a) (1949) as amended]. 
However, regulations also confer the benefit of the civil service statute on employees 
having competitive status and occupying positions which though excepted from the 
classified civil service either by statute or executive order are not of a confidential or 
policy-determining character [5 C.F.R. §§9.101 (b) (1), 9.102 (a) (1949) as amended] and 
also on those employees who hold indefinite appointments to positions in the classified 
civil service whether or not they have competitive status [5 C.F.R. §2.ll4 (h)]. 
63 5 C.F.R. §§6.l to 6.300 (1949) as amended. 
64 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 567 (1934). 
65 When a position is excepted from the competitive civil service under authority of 
an executive order, it is placed on Schedules A, B, or C, and it will depend on which 
schedule the position is what civil service rules and regulations are applicable. Of course, 
absent a statutory provision, the President may by executive order transfer a position from 
one schedule to another or reclassify it back into the competitive civil service. 
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viduals but as to classes of government servants. But, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently held in Roth v. 
Brownell66 that, even though positions had been excepted by the 
President from the provisions of the civil service statute, the 
removal procedures of that act still applied to the incumbents of 
the positions. Congress could, of course, afford even greater pro-
tection to civil servants in this regard but, as a concomitant of 
this power, it could also at any time abolish positions or achieve 
the same result as far as the displaced employee is concerned by 
shortening his term of appointment to office sufficiently to make 
it expire. 
C. Some Loyalty Problems 
As was indicated earlier a civil servant's "lot is not a happy 
one," but insecurity of tenure has been aggravated by the imple-
mentation_ of the loyalty program designed to remove from the 
government service those persons whose loyalty to the United 
States is doubtful. We have already noted the Hatch Act, the pur-
pose of which is to restrict the political activities of government 
servants,67 and the statute authorizing the suspension and removal 
for security reasons of persons in particular departments. That 
statute may generally be considered to apply to certain "sensitive 
positions" in the government service, 68 but it should be noted 
that if implemented to cover the whole of the civil service ( and 
the unfettered power of doing this is lodged in the President69), 
it would have the effect of scrapping the merit system in govern-
ment employment. 
However, most problems arise under the executive orders 
issued in 194770 and 1953.71 The earlier order was issued by 
President Truman and provided for the refusal of employment 
and the removal from the government service where "on all the 
evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person 
involved to the Government of the United States."72 The stand-
66 (D.C. Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 500. 
67 Note 5 supra. 
68 Note 9 supra. 
69 64 Stat. L. 477, §3 (1950), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22 (3). 
70 No. 9835 dated March 21, 1947, amended by Exec. Order No. 10241 dated April 28, 
1951. 
71 No. 10450 dated April 27, 1953, amended by Exec. Order No. 10491 dated Oct. 13, 
1953. 
72 Supra note 70, Part V, §1. 
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ard set by the 1953 order which supplanted the earlier one is 
that the termination of the employment is, in the opinion of the 
head of the department or agency concerned, "necessary or ad-
visable in the interests of the national security."73 Thus the gov-
ernment has a wider discretion under the later order and, con-
versely, under it the civil servant has less protection than under 
the 1947 order. Under both the old and the current order certain 
activities and associations of the employee or applicant for em-
ployment are considered in this connection. The only three of 
these which need concern us at all here are (I) serving "the inter-
ests of another government in preference to the interests of the 
United States," (2) "sympathetic association with ... any rep-
resentative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical 
to the interests of the United States," and (3) "membership in, 
or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or 
domestic organization, association, movement, group or combina-
tion of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or sub-
versive, or which . . . seeks to alter the form of government of 
the United States by unconstitutional means."74 
But, rather than consider these provisions at this stage it will 
be more useful to analyze the constitutional issues under the fol-
lowing heads: (I) the President's power to issue the orders; (2) 
their constitutionality under the First Amendment; (3) the pos-
sible application to them or to either of them of the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment; (4) their validity in the light 
of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment. The two executive 
orders do not require separate treatment since they differ in 
detail and not in principle and, for the sake of simplicity, the 
terms "order" or "executive order" when used in the following 
analysis may be taken to refer to either or both of the orders. 
I. The first c<?nstitutional question is the source of the Presi-
dent's power to issue the order. The broadest basis for this is the 
executive power, and in M-yers v. United States,75 as modified by 
Humphrey's Executor (Rathbun) v. United States,76 the Supreme 
Court emphasized that, under his duty to supervise the adminis-
tration of the executive branch of the government, the President 
73 Supra note 71, §6. The section provides for suspension and then either reinstate-
ment or removal in accordance with the prescribed procedure (§1). 
74 Id., now §8. 
75 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926). 
76 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869 (1935). 
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has an illimitable power of removal of persons filling predomi-
nantly executive positions in the government service.77 This 
power of removal does not directly78 extend to include the vast 
majority of government servants who are either inferior officers 
appointed by the President alone, the courts of law or the heads 
of departments, or employees of the United States wherever Con-
gress has vested their appointment. It may be noted too that 
Congress may prescribe the conditions of employment and limit 
the grounds of removal of such government servants.79 
But these restrictions would .not appear to affect the Presi-
dent's power to promulgate the executive order as he also has a 
twin statutory source of power. First, the Hatch Act provides for 
the removal of federal servants who are members of organizations 
advocating the overthrow by force of the constitutional form of 
government,80 and a 1950 statute81 provides for the suspension 
and removal of persons in certain departments and agencies for 
national security reasons. Secondly, under the 1871 statute the 
President may "prescribe such regulations for the admission of 
persons into the civil service of the United States as may best pro-
mote the efficiency thereof, and ascertain the fitness of each candi-
date in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, and ability."82 
Under the 1883 act he may promulgate regulations prepared by 
the Civil Service Commission necessary for the establishment and 
maintenance of the merit system.83 But, there is a limit to his 
powers in this regard in that the 1912 amendment to the civil 
service statute restricts the removal of persons in the classified 
77 Myers' case applied this principle to all executive officers, but in Rathbun's case it 
was held that the President's illimitable removal power did not extend to persons in 
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial positions in government. Thus, the President's removal 
power extends to all persons performing predominantly executive functions. Of course, 
Congress may, under the civil service laws, deprive the President of the power to remove 
minor officers and employees. See generally CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 
428, n. 80 (1948). 
78 It is clear that Congress may deprive the President of his power of removal except 
in the case of officers whose appointments are made by him with the consent of the 
Senate [See Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 225 (1839); United States v. Perkins, 116 
U.S. 483, 6 S.Ct. 449 (1886)]. But_ the President, by bringing pressure to bear upon the 
appropriate departmental head, may achieve the desired result indirectly. 
79 E.g., see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947); Ex 
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, I S.Ct. 381 (1882); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 
21 (1926). 
80 See note 5 supra, §9A (1). 
8164 Stat. L. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22. 
82 Rev. Stat. §1753 (1875), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §631. 
8_3 22 Stat. L. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §633. 
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civil service to "such cause as will promote the efficiency of said 
service. "84 
While in view of these provisions an order designed to secure 
the removal of a certain ·class of government servants because of 
their political beliefs would be ultra vires the statutory rule-
making power ( and to a certain extent in conflict with one of the 
Civil Service Rules85), presidential regulations, aimed at ridding 
the government of persons as to whose loyalty there is a reasonable 
doubt, have been rightly upheld.86 The true rationale for this 
is that discharge of or refusal of employment to such persons has 
a reasonable relation to the promotion of the efficiency of the 
service.87 On this view the executive order cannot be assailed as 
a usurpation of legislative power88 and the standards for employ-
ment in, and removal from, the government prescribed therein 
must therefore be attacked on the constitutionality of their content 
rather than on the validity of their origin. 
2. The guarantees of the First Amendment have always been 
held to include freedom of political thought and expression,89 but 
84 See note 6 supra, at 555. 
85 5 C.F.R. (Supp. 1955) §04.2: "No person employed in the executive branch of the 
Federal Government who has authority to take or recommend any personnel action with 
respect to any person who is an employee in the competitive service or any eligible or 
applicant for a position in the competitive service shall make any inquiry concerning 
the race, political affiliation or religious beliefs of any such employee, eligible, or appli-
cant. All disclosures concerning such matters shall be ignored, except as to such member-
ship in political parties or organizations as constitutes by law a disqualification for Gov-
ernment employment. No discrimination shall be exeri;:ised, threatened, or promised by 
any person in the executive branch of the Federal Government against or in favor of any 
employee in the competitive service, or any eligible or applicant for a position in the 
competitive service because of his race, political affiliation or religious beliefs, except as 
may be authorized or required by law.'' 
86 In Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22, it was held that a 
war service regulation permitting the removal from the federal service of one concerning 
whose loyalty to the government the Civil Service Commission entertained a reasonable 
doubt, was reasonable and proper and the making thereof was within the scope of the 
authority conferred on the Commission by the civil service act and certain executive orders. 
Likewise see Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964; and Bailey v. Rich-
ardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46. However, in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 at 
350, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955), Black, J., expressed grave doubts as to whether the presidential 
order had been authorized by an act of Congress and furthermore doubted if Congress 
could have given the President such a power. 
87 Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22. In Kutcher v. Gray, 
(D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783 at 786, it was specifically held that "the efficiency of the 
service" would be promoted by the removal of a disloyal federal civil service employee. 
88 Contra, "The Constitutional Right to Advocate Political, Social and Economic 
Change-An Essential of American Democracy," 7 LAW. GUILD. REv. 57 at 69 (1947). 
89 E.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 at 369, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931), per Hughes, 
C.J.: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained 
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none of the First Amendment liberties are absolutes90 and, in any 
case, the amendment prohibits only congressional action.91 Never-
theless, it seems clear that the First Amendment operates indirect-
ly as a limitation on the executive as well as on the legislative 
power and, consequently, the executive order must be subject to 
its restrictions. Insofar as the executive order represents the exer-
cise of the President's statutory rule-making power, it is obviously 
subject to the First Amendment.92 Again, it may reasonably be 
argued in the light of dicta in earlier decisions93 that, insofar as it 
represents an exercise of the executive power granted to the Presi-
dent by the Constitution, it is subject to a like restriction. Alter-
natively, the First Amendment will be applicable if there is any 
foundation for the invocation of the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. For it has been held by a lower court that 
each liberty specified in the First Amendment is a liberty which 
is- secured to all persons by the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.94 .:lt may also be maintained that, although the "lib-
erty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is different from the 
"liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the due 
process clause of the former amendment should apply to executive 
action and render the First Amendment applicable. Certainly 
there have been frequent holdings that the due process clause of 
by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a funda-
mental principle of our constitutional system." 
90 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 571-572, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942). In 
more recent decisions [e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951); 
13eauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952)] the Supreme Court has retreated 
from the position that freedom of speech and expression occupies a preferred place in 
the constitutional scheme. For, as Jackson, J., succinctly remarked in 13rinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 at 180, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949), "We cannot give some constitutional 
rights a preferred position without relegating others to a deferred position." And see 
Frankfurter, J., in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 88, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949). In practice, 
• what is meant by the preferred place of First Amendment freedoms is that the govern-
ment must show that it had reasonable grounds to pass any statute abridging such free-
doms, i.e., it is more a question of the burden of proof than a presumption of validity 
or invalidity. 
91 U.S. CoNsr., amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
92 And see Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208 (1944). 
93 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 at 124-125 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 
I at 25, 63 S.Ct. I (1942). This power was presumed by the court to exist in Washington 
v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964, and Dailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 
F. (2d) 46. 
94 United States v. Komer, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 242. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment95 
and that it restricts all state action whether legislative, judicial or 
executive.96 
As we have already intimated, the First Amendment does not 
give an absolute right to freedom of speech, assembly, or of politi-
cal expression.97 In the case of the government servant restric-
tions on those rights have been justified from two points of view.98 
The first is that by accepting government employment a person 
may have to waive certain rights which he would otherwise have 
as an ordinary citizen. While this approach has the authority of 
Justice Holmes' famous epigram that a person "may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right 
to be a policeman,"99 it is specious and, although constantly ap-
pearing in the judgments of the courts, is not justified by the 
decisions themselves. In fact, the courts have always required 
that any encroachment upon the liberties of government servants 
should bear a reasonable relation to proper governmental activi-
ties.100 
The fallacy in the first approach lies in the attempt to treat 
the government as an ordinary employer of labor. The point is 
that the federal government derives its powers from the Constitu-
tion and, as shown by the decision of the Court in United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell/01 the Constitution does not authorize dis-
crimination against federal employees in the exercise of personal 
freedoms. Admittedly, the government, as any other employer, 
is under no obligation to hire as an employee anyone who does 
not come up to certain standards. Nevertheless, not only must the 
same basic standard be applied to all comers102 but also the stand-
95 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 at 666, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925). 
96E.g., Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255 (1937). 
97 See note 90 supra. 
98 See generally note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1161 (1947). 
99 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 at 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). 
100 E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). Indeed 
in McAuliffe's case Holmes, J., appeared to recognize the same qualification for he said 
(supra note 99, at 220): "On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable 
condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable, 
if that be a question open to revision here." 
101 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). 
1021bid. 
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ards set must meet the test of reasonableness and appropriate-
ness.103 
The second point of view is that certain limitations may al-
ways be imposed on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 
But, as the United Public Workers case104 shows, the test for the 
validity of restrictions on government employees' activities in this 
direction is not the commonly applied clear-and-present-danger 
test but is the criterion of reasonable relation. In the first place, 
it was indicated in American Communications Association v. 
Douds105 that the clear-and-present-danger test is confined to cases 
where the government's objective is to curtail speech for its own 
sake and on that reasoning it was not available in the United 
Public Workers case. Secondly, the dissents of Justices Black and 
Douglas overlook the long history of regulations designed to pro-
mote impartiality in the civil service and the application to them 
of the "reasonableness" test in Ex parte Curtis.106 Thirdly, there 
are numerous areas where the Supreme Court has deferred to 
the legislative judgment and ignored the clear-and-present-danger 
test, adopting instead the criterion of reasonableness.107 Finally, 
it may be pointed out that the loyalty program was not initiated 
to control political beliefs but to ensure against the infiltration 
and retention in government employment of persons whose loyalty 
could reasonably be doubted or whose presence there might not 
be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. 
It can hardly be denied that the program bears a reasonable rela-
tion to the admittedly proper purpose of ensuring that the gov-
·ernment of the country is managed by persons of unquestionable 
103 See note 100 supra. Of course, it is clear that the Executive can discriminate for 
political reasons in selecting personnel. See Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. 
(2d) 46 at 63. Thus, a Republican president _may appoint few, if any, Democrats to office 
without violating any provision of the Constitution. 
104 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1946). 
105 339 U.S. 382 at 396, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950). 
106 106 U.S. 371, 1 S.Ct. 381 (1882). Admittedly Curtis' case was decided before 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), where the clear-and-present 
danger test was first applied. 
101 See (1) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944); and Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943) and like Japanese exclusion 
cases based on national self-preservation in wartime; (2) Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 
10 S.Ct. 299 (1890) (statute denying polygamists or members of such an organization the 
right to vote and to hold office upheld); (3) Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 
S.Ct. 358 (1905) (upholding constitutionality of compulsory vaccination provision even 
though it restricted liberty of the person). And see Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. 
Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22. 
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loyalty,108 and so the public interest in a loyal and efficient civil 
service will outbalance the public interest in freedom of speech.109 
3. Even if we assume for the moment that there is a founda-
tion for the invocation of the clause, it seems that to attack the 
executive order as violative of due process affords little more 
chance of success. The three objections which could be raised 
are that it imputes guilt by association, that it is void for vague-
ness, and that it does not satisfy procedural due process require-
ments. 
Admittedly, if membership in one of the listed organizations 
were in itself taken to establish a reasonable ground for belief 
in an employee's lack of loyalty, guilt by association, which has 
been considered as violating "one of the most fundamental prin-
ciples of our jurisprudence,"110 would result. However, proceed-
ings under the loyalty program are not criminal and it would 
seem from the cases that they are not sufficiently analogous to 
criminal proceedings to warrant the application of a principle 
which has thus far been restricted to criminal proceedings.111 In 
any case both the President112 and an attorney general113 have 
emphasized that membership in, affiliation or sympathetic asso-
ciation with, a designated organization is simply one piece of 
evidence which may or may not be helpful in arriving at a con-
clusion as to the action which is to be taken in a particular case. 
In a recent decision114 a federal civil service employee had been 
10s In Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2<l) 22, the court squarely 
held that an employee may be dismissed because of his views, opinions, or affiliations, and 
in so doing clearly applied the reasonable relation test. See Washington v. Clark, (D.C. 
D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964; Sherman, "Loyalty and the Civil Servant," 20 ROCKY MT. L. 
REv. 381 (1948) (advocating the application of the clear and present danger test); 
Emerson and Helfeld, "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58 YALE L.J. I at 85 ff. 
(1948). 
109 Chafee suggests that the boundary line of the First Amendment should be fixed 
by the balancing of the two very important social interests in the search for truth and in 
the public safety. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1948). 
110 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 at 163, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945). See, too, Schneiderman 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 136 and at 154, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943); and Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (1945), where it was said at 772: "Guilt with us 
remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies. It is not a matter of mass 
application."' · 
111 This follows from our discussion of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment 
below. 
112 5 C.F.R. §200.1 (1949), revoked, 18 FED. REG. 5699 (Sept. 25, 1953). 
113 Letter to Loyalty Review Board quoted in Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 
F. (2d) 783 at 788. 
114 Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783. The memorandum of the 
Loyalty Review Board was void because it was ultra vires the statutory rule-making 
authority of the Board. It was on the same grounds that the Court decided the first case 
of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951). 
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discharged in pursuance of a Loyalty Review Board memorandum 
ordaining removal on a finding that he was a member of an organ-
ization which had been designated by the attorney general as an 
organization seeking to overthrow the United States Government 
by unconstitutional means. The court of appeals held the dis-
charge to be improper (and the memorandum to be absolutely 
void) in the absence of a specific finding by the administrator of 
the agency in which the employee worked that, upon such evi-
dence, reasonable grounds existed for a belief that the employee 
was disloyal to the United States. 
Nor can the executive order be impugned on the ground of 
vagueness. Although a statute will be void for vagueness when 
the courts feel that it sets no standards at all115 or amounts to the 
delegation of legislative power to non-legislative bodies,116 and 
although the courts have been inclined to prescribe higher stand-
ards of definiteness and certainty in the case of legislation affect-
ing civil and political rights,117 this contention should receive 
short shrift. First, this is executive and not legislative delegation 
and, in view of the scope of his duties, it cannot plausibly be 
maintained that the President's directives to his own agents should 
conform to legally ascertainable standards of certainty. Secondly, 
the terms "communist," "fascist," "subversive," "totalitarian," 
"sympathetic association" arid- "affiliation," which may be con-
sidered too indefinite, are used with reference to organizations 
which are publicly liste.d by the attorney general.118 Further-
more, the attorney general can be required at the suit of such an 
organization to show a reasonable basis for making the designa-
tion.119 This should constitute adequate notice. The only other 
terms which may be questioned are "loyalty" and "interests of 
national security." The former term may have many meanings 
but, since it has thus far defied acceptable definition and since it 
is obvious that disloyal employees should not be retained in the 
government service, 120 it seems straining at gnats to attack the 
115 United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921); Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931). For a general discussion on this point see 
note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1161 at 1170-1171 (1947). 
116 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935). 
117 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88 at 101, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). 
118 The publicity requirement is imposed under ,i3 of Part ill of the former 1947 
order and by §12. of the 1953 order. See notes 70-71 supra. 
119 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, (D.C. D.C. 1952) 104 F. 
Supp. 567. 
120 This was clearly the view of the court in such cases as Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. 
Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, and Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22. 
1955] REMOVAL OF FEDERAL CIVIL SERVANTS 239 
order on this ground. The latter term may sound more vague but 
less stigma should attach to a removal thereunder since disloyalty 
is not the only ground, and it too should escape condemnation on 
the score of vagueness. 
Likewise it seems to be too late now to assail the order as 
violating procedural due process. The courts have always treated 
the removal of government servants as an executive and not as a 
judicial or quasi-judicial matter.121 We saw earlier in this article 
that the courts will not interfere provided the prescribed pro-
cedure is followed and provided there is no lack of good faith. 
The justification for this is more firmly founded than in the 
simple disinclination of the judiciary to meddle in the affairs of 
the executive branch of the government. It springs from the 
principle of inherent discretionary power reposing in the Presi-
dent enunciated in the Myers case,122 the exercise of which power 
would be inconsistent with a non-statutory requirement of com-
pliance with due process of law in such matters as adequacy of 
evidence and disclosure of names and the like. It should be noted, 
however, that, in line with their usual practice,123 the courts will 
insist on the scrupulous observance of the procedural requirements 
of the executive order. In Deak v. Pace,124 which effectively limits 
the implications of some of the dicta in Bailey v. Richardson, an 
order of the Secretary of War removing civilian employees of the 
War Department from service on the ground that such action 
was warranted by demands of national security, in that the em-
ployees allegedly attended Communist meetings and were inter-
ested in communist activities, was held not to comply with the 
statute requiring the employees to be informed with reasonable 
certainty and precision of the cause for removal, where no details 
as to times, places and organizations were furnished.125 The terms 
Thus, in Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783 at 786, it was said, ", .• it can-
not be argued that removal of a disloyal employee is not promotive of the 'efficiency of 
the service.' " 
121 See discussion supra and Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964, 
which involved the loyalty program. 
122 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926). 
123 See note 13 supra. 
124 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 997. 
125 It is quite possible that, should the question arise, the Court would overrule the 
decision in Deak v. Pace, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 997. Prettyman, C.J., in his dis-
senting opinion, which closely follows the reasoning of the court in Bailey v. Richardson, 
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, argues that the court could not force the Secretary of the 
Army to furnish "additional information" because the decision as to what data should be 
furnished lay in his judgment as to the national security. The court should not take it 
upon itself to decide that the "additional information" which it required to be furnished 
would not involve any security risk. 
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of the controlling statute· in that case are so similar to those of 
both the executive orders, and in fact are identical with those of 
the current order, that the requirement of some reasonable meas-
ure of specificity of charges should apply to removals under the 
loyalty program. . 
In order for the due process clause to be applicable to a situa-
tion there must be a deprivation of "life, liberty or property"12s. 
and, except when considering procedural due process, we have 
assumed thus far that the federal servant's "right" to his job comes 
within this provision. In numerous cases it has been considered 
that offices and employments are not property127 or contractua112s 
rights within the meaning and protection of the Constitution, 
and the court of appeals in Bailey v. Richardson129 took this view 
in holding that there was no foundation for the invocation of the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The effects of a dismissal under the loyalty program and the 
removed employee's struggles to obtain employment thereafter 
may be depicted in graphic and appealing colors.130 It may, there-
fore, be argued that the consequent loss of reputation amounts to 
the deprivation of a substantial property right,131 and that this 
is borne out by the fact that calling a person a communist or 
communist sympathizer is libelous per se.132 It may be contended 
that an administrative finding of disloyalty is equivalent to a 
judicial verdict of treason in the eyes of the world, but the clear 
fact remains that, if the government in the valid exercise of a 
governmental power injures an individual, that person has no 
redress.133 It is just as unte:qable to maintain that dismissals under 
126 U.S. CoNsr., amend. V provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law •... " 
127 E.g., Butler v. Pennsylvania, IO How. (51 U.S.) 402 (1850); Taylor and Marshall 
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 at 577, 20 S.Ct. 1009 (1900). 
12s E.g., Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, IO S.Ct. 431 (1890); Field v. Giegenack, 
(D.C. Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 945. 
129 Despite numerous dicta to the contrary in earlier cases [ e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 
I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 at 162 (1803); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 at 
320 (1866)] the clear weight of authority supports the view taken by the court and it is 
now too late to hope that the court will hold otherwise. 
130 For a general discussion of the question, see the articles referred to in note 108 
supra, and also Kaplan, "Loyalty Review of Federal Employees,'' 23 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 
437 (1948), and O'Brian, "Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association," 61 HARv. L. REv. 592 
(1948). . 
131 See note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107 at 156-158 (1951). Contra, Angilly v. United States, 
(2d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 642 at 644, per Augustus Hand, J. 
132 Spane! v. Pegler, (7th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 619 at _621, citing cases from other 
jurisdictions. 
133 United States v. Sanders, (10th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 458; Bailey v. Richardson, 
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46; Cochran v. Couzens, (D.C. D.C. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 783 
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the loyalty program must constitute an exception to the general 
rule since they are damaging to reputation, subject the removed 
employee to moral obloquy and are injurious to his prospects of 
future employment. But, so are dismissals for accepting bribes,184 
for repeated attempts at seduction by force,1 35 for malfeasance in 
office;136 yet the government's right to dismiss employees on those 
grounds without the safeguards of due process has not been seri-
ously questioned. 
Again, it may be argued that there is no deprivation of liberty 
because the government is entitled to insist on the continuing 
faithfulness of its servants, and because those persons who are in 
effect labeled as disloyal are still free to hold their particular 
political philosophies outside government employment. For ob-
vious reasons every citizen cannot demand that the government 
employ him in some capacity. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that an applicant for a position and a person holding a position 
have no rights. One reason for the failure to appreciate this 
distinction is that the apparent lack of a ready remedy often con-
notes the nonexistence of a right. But this is not necessarily so. 
Let us consider this first from the point. of view of the appli-
cant for office. Both United States v. Lovett137 and Bailey v. 
Richardson138 recognized that a bar to future employment may 
amount to punishment-if a legislative act, such a bar may be a 
bill of attainder, 139 and if an executive act it may amount to 
punishment within the meaning of, and so subject to, the Sixth 
Amendment.140 This is not the whole answer. In the first place, 
a qualification or disqualification must bear some reasonable rela-
tion to the advancement of the public welfare141 and, although 
(holding that anyone may be attacked with impunity by a congressman while he is on the 
floor of Congress). 
134 Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 466 (1918). 
135 Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 682 (1934). 
136 Kent v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 280 (1946). And see Angilly v. United States, 
(2d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 642. 
137 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). 
138 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46. 
139 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). 
140 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46. 
141 People v. Crane, 21.4 N.Y. 154 at 161, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), per Cardozo, J.: "Since 
government, in expending public moneys, is expending the money of its citizens, it may 
not by arbitrary discriminations having no relation to the public welfare, foster the 
employment of one class of its citizens and discourage the employment of others." How-
ever, as we noted (supra note 103), the Executive can discriminate in public employment 
for political reasons. Still, once a person is in the classified civil service, he can be 
removed only under the provisions of the civil service statute. 
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not material to the present inquiry, this does indicate that the 
applicant for employment is not destitute of legal rights. Further-
more, though a person does not have an absolute right to a position 
in the government service, yet as between himself and other 
applicants he cannot be disqualified on illegal grounds.142 Thus, 
Congress cannot provide that "no Republica:r;i, Jew or Negro shall 
be appointed to federal office."143 In other words, a person has 
the constitutional right to the opportunity to compete equally 
with others for a position and not to be adjudged ineligible il-
legally. It may reasonably be argued that these rights should come 
within the meaning of "liberty" in the due process clause.144 
We may now consider in this light the position of a federal 
servant. Like most aphorisms, Chief Justice Fuller's remark in 
Crenshaw v. United States,145 that an officer enjoys a privilege 
revocable by the sovereignty at will, is not completely ,accurate. 
It has been suggested146 that, applying the principle that one may 
be denied his liberty if he is punished for exercising it,147 removal 
from office should come within this category when it is based 
upon the exercise by the employee of a constitutional right. Thus, 
in his concurring opinion in the recent case of Peters v. Hobby148 
(which, however, was decided by the Court on another ground149), 
Justice Douglas said: "It [the practice of using "faceless inform-
ers"] deprives men of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, for one of men's most precious liberties is his right 
to work. When a man is deprived of that 'liberty' without a fair 
trial, he is denied due process." It is better,150 however, to ap-
proach the problem from the point of view of the "privilege" of 
142 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951) 
[citing Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939)]: "The fact that one may not have 
a legal right to get or keep a government post does not mean that he can be adjudged 
ineligible illegally." 
143 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 79, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). 
144 This was suggested in Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N.Y. 173 at 186, 
25 N.E. 274 (1890). 
145 134 U.S. 99 at 108, 10 S.Ct. 431 (1890). 
146 Comment, 46 MICH. L. R.Ev. 942 at 948 ff. (1948). 
147 Bomar v. Keyes, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 136 at 139; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943). 
148 349 U.S. 331 at 350, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955). 
149 The Court avoided the constitutional issues and decided the case simply on the 
ground that the Loyalty Review Board had no power under the executive order to 
conduct -a "post-audit" of Peters' case on its own motion, after the agency loyalty board 
had twice ruled there was no reasonable ground to doubt Peters' loyalty. 
150 One disadvantage of the suggested test is that it ignores the fact that in both 
Lovett's case, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), and Bailey's case, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. 
(2d) 46, it was not the dismissal on loyalty grounds but the bar to future employment 
which was invalidated by the courts: another is that it is subject to the same objections 
which have been sufficient to deny relief in other cases. 
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working for the government. For although, as was pointed out in 
Friedman v. Schwellenbach,151 the power to appoint includes the 
power to condition or qualify the appointment, it does not follow 
that every denial of a privilege is constitutional. 
In the case of the postal system the courts have frequently 
held152 that the use of the mails, though a privilege, is not one 
which may be extended or withheld on any grounds. The govern-
ment is under no obligation to establish a post office in a particular 
locality but once it does so it cannot arbitrarily pick and choose 
those members of the public whom it will serve.153 Again, in 
determining whether any publication is obscene the postmaster 
general necessarily passes on a question involving the fundamental 
liberties of the citizen, which is a judicial and not an executive 
function and must be exercised according to the ideas of due 
process implicit in the Fifth Amendment.154 
Another analogy is from the Supreme Court decision in Frost 
v. Railroad Commission of Califorriia.155 In that case the Court 
held that, assuming that the use of its highways by private carriers 
for hire is a privilege which the state may deny, it cannot con-
stitutionally affix to that privilege the unconstitutional condi-
tion that the carrier shall assume against his will the burdens and 
duties of a common carrier. The rationale of the Court is par-
ticularly pertinent to the present discussion. Justice Sutherland, 
delivering the opinion of the Court, said: 
151 (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22 at 24. 
152 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democrat Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 
U.S. 407, 41 S.Ct. 352 (1921); Pike v. Walker, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 37; Hannegan 
v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 66 S.Ct. 456 (1946). 
153 See Pike v. Walker, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 37 at 39. It is this factor which 
disproves the validity of an analogy drawn from the oft-quoted dicta in Packard v. 
Banton, 264 U.S. 140 at 145, 44 S.Ct. 257 (1924), that "a distinction must be observed 
between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and 
one carried on by government sufferance or permission. In the latter case the power to 
exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition and may justify a 
degree of regulation not admissible in the former." It may also be argued that there is 
an essential distinction between the mail service and public employment which nullifies 
the validity of the analogy. The postal system is a monopoly which the government 
enforces through statutes forbidding the carrying of letters by other means whereas 
people do not have to work for the government. But, in view of the relation of allegiance 
and its correlative existing between the citizen and his government, and of the fact that 
the government is by far the largest employer of labor in die country and plays such a 
dominant part in the lives of the people, this argument should not be deemed controlling. 
154 Walker v. Popenoe, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 511. And, in Hannegan v. 
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 at 151, 66 S.Ct. 456 (1945), the Court characterized the power 
of censorship to be "a power •.. so abhorrent to our traditions" and said that a purpose 
on the part of Congress to grant that power to the Postmaster General was not lightly to 
be inferred. 
155 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926). 
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"It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a 
general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege al-
together, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to 
impose. But, the power of the state in that respect is not 
unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not 
impose conditions which require the relinquishment of con-
stitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender 
of one constitutional · right as a condition of its favor, it 
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is in-
conceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution 
of the United States may thus be manipulated out of ex-
istence."156 
On this basis it may reasonably be maintained (though the 
proposition is not free from difficulties157) that the "right" to, 
or "privilege" of government employment is one of the liberties 
protected by the due process clause, and that removals under the 
loyalty program must satisfy both substantive and procedural due 
process. However, this argument has little chance of prevailing 
in the courtroom. On the one hand, there is only a tenuous 
connection between the "right" or "privilege" of government 
employment and "liberty or property" within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, if that connection was 
considered sufficient to require the application of due process 
requirements, it would be necessary not only to overturn liter-
ally dozens of cases158 and, furthermore, to hold the Lloyd-La 
Follette Act which was originally enacted as a concession to civil 
servants unconstitutional as not affording them sufficient pro-
tection,159 but also to scrap part of the theory of executive power 
and administrative supervision explained in the Myers case. There-
fore, it is highly unlikely that the courts would venture into 
such uncharted and hazardous waters. 
The dictum in the United Public Workers case 160 that arbi-
trary discrimination between classes of citizens in the matter of 
156 Id. at 593-594. 
157 The chief difficulty is in discounting the argument that the government may 
reasonably require its employees to be of unquestionable loyalty, and that the application 
of the theory of the separation of powers demands that the management of internal 
affairs of the executive branch of the government shall not be controlled by the judiciary. 
158 E.g., see the list of cases cited in Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 
46 at 64, n. 34. 
159 See note 6 supra. It will be recalled that confrontation of witnesses and granting 
of a hearing under the statute are in the discretion of the removing officer. 
160 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). 
• 
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public employment is unconstitutional and the corollary that 
there must be a reasonable relation between qualifications and 
disqualifications for employment and the needs of the public 
service indicate that action violative thereof would be an in-
fringement of due process. The importance of this lies not in its 
application to the loyalty program-for, although the earlier 
executive order distinguished loyal and disloyal employees, the 
classification could not be considered an arbitrary one-but in 
the indication it gives that there are some rights attaching to 
employment under the federal government. 
4. The final constitutional issue is whether or not the ex-
ecutive order violates the Sixth Amendment.161 The argument for 
the application of the constitutional provision is that a dismissal 
on loyalty grounds is punishment and consequently can be in-
flicted only upon compliance with the Sixth Amendment. It is 
clear that the deprivation of a privilege may amount to punish-
ment within the protection of the clause in the Constitution 
prohibiting bills of attainder162 but the courts have in recent 
years narrowed the definition of punishment for this purpose. 
The combined effect of United States v. Lovett and Bailey v. 
Richardson indicates beyond reasonable doubt that dismissals on 
loyalty grounds will not be considered punishment either within 
the bills of attainder clause of the Constitution or within the 
scope of the Sixth Amendment. 
In Lovett' s case an appropriation statute prohibited the pay-
ment of salary or compensation out of moneys then or thereafter 
to be appropriated ( except for services as jurors or members of the 
armed forces) of the three plaintiffs unless they were again ap-
pointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The 
plaintiffs sued in the Court of Claims for services rendered sub-
sequent to the effective date of the statute and on appeal the 
161 The amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." In both 
Lovett's and Bailey's cases it was held that punishment can be inflicted lawfully only upon 
compliance with the amendment. 
162 E.g., American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 389-390, 70 
S.Ct. 674 (1950); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 192, 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952); United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 100, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1946); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). 
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Supreme Court held that the act was a bill of attainder and not 
a mere appropriation measure over which Congress has complete 
control.. The decision was rested on the grounds that "permanent 
proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is 
punishment,"163 and the fact that punishment is inflicted through 
the instrumentality of an act specifically cutting off the pay of 
certain named individuals found by Congress to be guilty of dis-
loyalty makes it no less effective than if it had been done by a 
statute which designated the conduct as criminal. 
Four years later in Bailey v. Richardson164 the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia applied the reasoning in Lovett' s 
case to invalidate an order of the Loyalty Review Board barring 
her from the federal service for three years as amounting to 
punishment within the aegis of the Sixth Amendment. However, 
the court rested its decision squarely on the fact that dismissal 
itself does not amount to punishment-it was the proscriptive 
nature of the order which did that.165 
Professor Gardner166 develops the interesting thesis from these 
decisions that the essential constituent of punishment is not the 
infliction of physical hardship but the expression of the com-
munity's hatred, fear or contempt, and thus that, "Any official 
decision which passes a moral judgment on a named individual 
and, as a consequence of that. judgment, deprives the individual 
of the opportunity to associate, cooperate, and compete with his 
fellow citizens on a basis of complete equality, has the character of 
a criminal judgment, and may therefore be rendered only after 
a public trial upon such evidence as would be admissible in a 
criminal case."167 This approach derives some support from 
Bridges v. Wixon168 and Schneiderman v. United States169 where 
deportation, though not technically a criminal proceeding, was 
held, because of its penal nature, to have to comply with the most 
rigid standards of a fair hearing. On the other hand, in the 
163 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). 
164 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46. 
165 Although it may be argued that in practice a finding of disloyalty, which no other 
board would be likely to reject later, is as permanent a bar from federal employment as 
that condemned in Lovett's case, the fact remains that in law there is a distinction and 
the distinction saves both the employer's inherent right to discharge and the applicant's 
inherent right to be considered and not adjudged ineligible illegally. 
166 Gardner, "Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States," 33 
BOST. UNIV. L. REV. 176 (1953). 
167 Id. at 191. 
168 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945). 
169 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943). 
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Japanese exclusion cases170 no procedural safeguards were required 
by the courts even though the decisions involved the admission 
of a presumption of disloyalty against the Japanese race-a pre-
sumption which had originally been invoked by the executive 
and legislature. Again, the provision in the Labor-Management 
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act171 denying the benefits of the 
statute to labor unions unless their officers file non-Communist 
affidavits was upheld in American Communications Association v. 
Douds.172 Referring to the Japanese exclusion cases, the Court 
said that, if accidents of birth and ancestry under some circum-
stances justify an inference concerning future conduct, it can 
hardly be doubted that voluntary affiliations and beliefs justify 
a similar inference when drawn by the legislature on the basis 
of its investigations. Furthermore, the court in Bailey v. Richard-
son stressed the fact that proscription for a short period of time 
may not always amount to punishment.173 
There is a further reason why Professor Gardner's thesis must 
be rejected. The judicial process requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment are not applicable to an honest exercise of executive 
power such as the discharge of an employee performing predomi-
nantly executive functions,174 and the extension of judicial inter-
ference impliedly advocated by Professor Gardner would be con-
trary to the basic concept of the separation of powers in that it 
would have the effect of forcing the President to retain the serv-
ices of persons whose loyalty he reasonably doubts.175 
Even though the wisdom of implementing the loyalty program 
may be doubted, even if it promotes only witch-hunting, disil-
lusionment and fear, even if it sterilizes the civil service, induces 
conformity to set standards and muzzles the freedom of political 
170 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944); Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1942). 
17161 Stat. L. 136 at 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §141 et seq. 
172 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950). 
173 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46 at 55: "A general order that 
no person who is denied permanent employment after a conditional appointment be 
reemployed for three years might well be valid. The bar in the present proceeding 
appears on the record to be one imposed by the Board upon this particular individual in 
this particular case as a matter of individual adjudication." 
174 Thus, in Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783, it was held that 
proceedings involving an employee under the loyalty program are purely administrative 
in character, in no sense criminal, and do not require the constitutional and traditional 
safeguards of a judicial trial. 
175 Professor Gardner's other thesis ["Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of 
the United States," 33 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 176 (1953)] is that there should be a distinction 
drawn between discharge for inefficient service and dismissal for dishonorable conduct 
deserves serious consideration. 
248 MICHIGAN 'LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
expression of those in the employ of the government,176 there is 
little chance, unless the courts are willing to make a radical de-
parture not merely from decisions but from principles which 
have been the outgrowth of the basic theory of government, i.e., 
of the separation of powers, that in its present form it will be 
challenged successfully. 
D. The Civil Servant and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
Another loyalty problem arises from the refusal by government 
employees or applicants for positions in the government service 
to give evidence on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate 
them. Does the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment177 constitute grounds 
for the removal of a government servant or the disqualification of 
an applicant for federal employment? Although it is frequently 
done in practice, it is not proper to presume guilt from the silence 
of a person called upon to testify, for "The privilege is for the 
innocent as well as the guilty and no inference can be drawn 
against the person claiming it that he fears that he is 'engaged in 
doing something forbidden by federal law.' "178 The point is that 
to infer guilt in such a case is not simply to deny a privilege 
guaranteed by the Constitution; it is also contrary to the popularly-
respected principle that a person shall be presumed innocent until 
he is proved guilty. Admittedly there are no Supreme Court 
decisions which go so far as to say that the presumption of in-
nocence is an established constitutional principle but there are 
certainly numerous federal and state statutes based on that premise. 
In fact, invocation of the privilege is very likely to raise a pre-
sumption of guilt179 in the minds of the public, and there is no 
176 For a factual analysis of the loyalty program and its policy aspects, see BoNTECOu, 
THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM (1953). 
1.77 U.S. CONST., amend. V, provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself ..•. " 
178 Spector v. United States, (9th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 1002 at 1006. And see 8 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 276 ff. (1940), particularly §2251 where he summarizes the 
_policy reasons for the privilege as "The truth is that the privilege exists for the sake of · 
the innocent-or at least for reasons irrespective of the guilt of the accused." 
179 E.g., In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12811 at 19 (D.C. Ala. 1865) (in denouncing 
a statute prescribing a test oath for attorneys wishing to practice in the federal courts): 
"The maxim of the law is, 'Accusare nemo debet se, nisi coram Deo.' The demand of this 
statute is that by the offer of affirmative proof of innocence the applicant for admission 
to practice shall create, as against himself, a presumption of guilt .•.. If he keep silence, 
he is thereby deprived of a constitutional right; if he speak, he becomes 'a witness against 
himself.'" 
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charge more difficult to refute than an allegation of disloyalty. The 
effect of this is aggravated by the fact that in times of crisis the 
easiest way to discredit and ruin a person in the eyes of the com-
munity is to brand him as disloyal. 
What we have just said is not the whole answer to the problem. 
It is not sufficient to say that, even though public employment 
may be termed a privilege rather than a right, refusal of, or re-
moval from government employment is necessarily unconstitu-
tional if based on the invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. The point is that the courts have (apparently 
conclusively) held that refusal of employment or dismissal from 
the government service is not in itself punishment calling for the 
application of due process or Sixth Amendment procedures. As 
we saw earlier, the government may require qualifications for 
federal employment so long as they bear reasonable relation to 
the work involved and to the efficiency of the service. There are 
some exceptions to this180 but the only important one for our 
purposes is that the government cannot impose arbitrary discrim-
inations. In Wieman v. Updegraff181 (which, however, concerned 
a state and not a federal employee) the Court said that "constitu-
tional protection does extend to the public servant whose ex-
clusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrimi-
natory." It is not sufficient to answer that the government may 
dismiss persons whose loyalty is doubtful; the point is that a re-
fusal to testify does not necessarily imply that the witness is dis-
loyal,182 and it may be argued that it is "patently arbitrary" to 
dismiss an employee for the sole reason that he has claimed a 
privilege guaranteed to him by the Constitution.183 
180 E.g., a disqualification will be invalid if it involves an executive or legislative 
determination of culpability. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 
(1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1866). 
181344 U.S. 183 at 192, 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952). And see Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548 at 585, 57 S.Ct. 883 (1937), and Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 at 14, 59 S.Ct. 
379 (1939), which indicate that the protection of due process extends to any type of 
arbitrary discrimination by the government. 
182 See Griswold, "The Fifth Amendment: An Old and Good Friend,'' 40 A.B.A.J. 
502 (1954), where the author explains how a man may be quite innocent of any disloyalty 
and yet feel obliged to invoke the protection of the privilege. But the privilege is personal 
and may not be used simply to shield others. See Saffo v. United States, (8th Cir. 1954) 
213 F. ( 2d) 131. 
183 See pp. 241-245 supra, where it is pointed out that, even where it grants a privilege, 
the government cannot impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitu-
tional rights. In view of this it is not clear that the government could insist on the waiver 
of the privilege as a condition of federal employment when making the original appoint-
ment to the government service. If the waiver requirement were restricted to matters 
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There have been two recent federal cases bearing directly 
on this point. In Orloff v. Willoughby184 the plaintiff, a physician 
inducted into the Army under the Doctors' Draft Law, was denied 
a commission because of his refusal on grounds of possible self-
incrimination to state in connection with his application therefor 
whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party. 
In denying his petition for a commission and for an order of dis-
charge from the Army the Court said that, although Orloff could 
not be punished for claiming a constitutional privilege, the Presi-
dent is not required to appoint to a position of honor and trust 
any person who refuses on grounds of possible self-incrimination 
to say whether he is or has been a member of the Communist 
Party.185 Justice Black in his dissenting judgment inferred that 
the retention of Orloff in the Army in his then capacity was punish-
ment and added: "And if some kind of punishment is to be im-
posed for asserting constitutional rights, it should not be imposed 
relevant to the employee's position, it might well be considered constitutional. On the 
other hand, if the waiver requirement was absolute, it could reasonably be argued that it 
was invalid on the ground that it arbitrarily discriminated against persons in non-sensitive 
positions in the government service because it was not reasonably related to the due 
performance of their duties. Although a federal servant may invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination [Rogers v. United States, (10th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 559], there are two 
points which support the view that the privilege is not an absolute right and, therefore, 
that the compulsory waiver of it by government workers as a condition of their employ-
ment may be subject to the "reasonable relation" test. In the first place, it is worth noting 
that the privilege is not safeguarded to the same extent as freedom of speech and religion 
[see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 323-328, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937)], nor is it consid-
ered an element of due process [ibid.; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 91-98 and 
106-114, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 50-55, 67 S.Ct. 1672 
(1947)]. In the second place, the constitutional guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments relating to criminal prosecutions may not be invoked in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces of the United States. The military law is due process of law to those in 
the armed forces and it is sufficient if proceedings comply with the military law. Ex parte 
Benton, (D.C. Cal. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 808, and the authorities there cited; Burns v. Wilson, 
346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045 (1953). 
184 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534 (1953). 
185 Id. at 91-92, where the pith of the matter is well stated by Jackson, J., for the 
Court " ... we cannot doubt that the President of the United States before certifying 
his confidence in an officer and appointing him to a commissioned rank, has the right to 
learn whatever facts the President thinks may affect his fitness ..•. [I]f there had never 
been an Attorney General's list the President would be within his rights in asking any 
questions he saw fit about the habits, associations and attitudes of the applicant for his 
trust and honor. Whether Orloff deserves appointment is not for judges to say. . . ." 
For the courts to interfere without further reason in that way would be unjustifiable 
prying into the affairs of the executive branch. 
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without a trial according to due process of law."186 The fallacy 
in this argument is the assumption that Orloff was suffering 
punishment in its legal sense. Of course, if the invocation of the 
privilege entailed not only dismissal but also permanent proscrip-
tion from the government service, the statute imposing that re-
quirement would be invalid as a bill of attainder.187 
Eighteen months later a district court in Levin v. Gillespie188 
held that a doctor's refusal t~ fill out a loyalty certificate in his 
application for an Army commission, claiming privilege against 
self-incrimination, furnished no grounds for his discharge from 
the service under conditions other than honorable following his 
induction under the Doctors' Draft Law for non-commissioned 
service. The court considered that no inferences unfavorable in 
character might be drawn from a resort to the constitutional 
privilege. Consequently, it held that there had been no finding 
regarding the doctor which would justify a conclusion that he 
had engaged in subversive activities or other conduct inimical to 
the welfare of the United States, so entitling the Army to give him 
a dishonorable discharge. 
These decisions do not settle the issues but they do indicate 
that the courts will apply the principles suggested earlier and that 
they will uphold the discharge of a federal servant for refusing 
on claim of privilege to testify, so long as the removal both meets 
the test of reasonableness and is not patently arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. In the event a statute189 requiring dismissal of 
government servants who refuse to testify on the grounds of pos-
sible self-incrimination is held unconstitutional, the government 
could validly achieve the same result by the use of immunity 
statutes. The use of this device has the great advantage that under 
immunity statutes the privilege against self-incrimination cannot 
186 Id. at 97. 
187 United States v. Lovett, ~28 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). 
188 (D.C. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 726. 
189 Although there is no federal statute prescribing removal for this reason, it is 
interesting to note that, under §8 (a) (8) of Exec. Order No. 10450 (1953), the refusal upon 
the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to testify before a con-
gressional committee regarding charges of alleged disloyalty or other misconduct is one of 
the matters to be investigated in determining whether or not the employment of a person 
or his retention in the employment of the federal government is "clearly consistent with 
the interests of the national security." 
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be claimed. It follows that a dismissal based on the testimony of 
a governme_nt servant given under such a statute would be founded 
squarely on an admission of guilt and not on inferences drawn 
from the claim of constitutional privilege.190 
190 This is the position under a recent Act of Congress-68 Stat. L. 745 (1954), 18 
U.S.C.A. §3486. The statute empowers congressional committees, the federal courts or 
grand juries, to compel testimony on matters relating to treason, sabotage, espionage, 
sedition, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of the government by force or violence; 
and in all cases there are at least two other independent but interested parties which must 
concur in the grant of immunity in order to meet the requirements of the statute. 
